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Abstract
This paper examines development processes of a country when the
degree of veriﬁability is endogenously determined. We characterize the
development processes rigorously and show that although the eﬀorts
for improving of veriﬁability are important, the income distribution
of a country is crucial for the eﬀectiveness of eﬀorts to the develop-
ment processes. Moreover, this paper explains the situation where one
country shows high growth rates temporally even if the technology of
enforcement is poor, but eventually it experiences economic collapses.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: E44, F43, O11.
Keywords: Credit market imperfection, quality of contract enforce-
ment, degree of veriﬁability, legal institution.
∗Address: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2-2 Wakamatsu-cho,
Shinjuku-ku Tokyo, 162-8677 Japan. E-mail: m.ando@grips.ac.jp.
†Address: Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-
ku Tokyo 113-0033, Japan. E-mail: yanagawa@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp.
11 Introduction
This paper examines development processes of a country when the enforce-
ment of contracts is imperfect and the degree of imperfection is endogenously
determined. We consider the situation where the country has to hire some
workers in order to improve the quality of contract enforcement. Thus im-
proving the quality of contract enforcement involves some costs. This paper
examines the dynamics of an economy when the enforcement is costly and
the improving of enforcement requires some labor forces.
Recently, many studies have focused on the importance of contract en-
forcement. These papers have pointed out that the quality of contract en-
forcement has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the macroeconomic performances and
the development process. For example, La Porta et al. (2000) has exam-
ined the relation between the legal system and the ﬁnancial performance.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Matsuyama (2004) derived the macroe-
conomic dynamics when the enforcement of contracts is imperfect and the
degree of imperfection is exogenously given. From the results of those pa-
pers, one may derive the following policy implication. “An improvement of
the quality of contract enforcement is an important factor for the economic
development. In order to enhance the productive activities, therefore, it is
better to promote the policies that improve the quality of contract enforce-
ment.”
In the above statement, however, the cost side of enforcement has been
ignored. The net beneﬁt of improving the contract enforcement is unclear
when we consider the cost side of improvement. Hence, we ask the following
questions: How the cost of enforcement aﬀects the investment decision and
the size of enforcement sector? What determines the macroeconomic perfor-
mance and the dynamic path of this economy? Is it better to promote the
enforcement activities by policy interventions? These questions are quite
important unsolved problems for developing countries. In this paper, we
examine these problems by using a simple macro dynamic model.
In order to improve the quality of contract enforcement, there are at least
two remarkable mechanisms.1 One mechanism is the legal enforcement as
stressed by La Porta et al. (2000). Making better legal rules and increasing
the quality of courts are important factors for improving the quality of legal
enforcement. To realize the purpose, suﬃcient number of policemen, judges
and bureaucrats (we call them “enforcers”) should be employed. In order to
hire those workers engaging the improvement of the enforceability, however,
the government has to pay the wage for those workers. Moreover, since they
do not engage in productive activities directly, raising the share of them
would decrease the total production level in this economy.2 Thus these
1Dixit (2003) compared the community enforcement under a long term relationship
and the third party enforcement with setup cost.
2In our setting, the investment for the enforcement sector involves a reduction of the
2“costs” should be considered when the government increases the number of
workers in the enforcement sector and improves the quality of enforcement.
Another mechanism is the community enforcement. Usually the com-
munity enforcement mechanism is implicit and uses the idea of the repeated
game structure. Repeated interactions in a community create the social
capital and it may enhance the enforcement of contracts.
This paper considers the former type of contract enforcement. How-
ever, our argument would be possible to more general mechanisms includ-
ing the later one. Our results can be extended to the case, for example,
entrepreneurs in a country by themselves construct suﬃcient size of enforce-
ment sector and they share the cost of enforcement.
Under the situation where the labor force is necessary for increasing the
size and quality of enforcement sector, we can derive several important im-
plications. First, how many workers should be allocated to the enforcement
sector is a crucial factor for economic development.
Second, the income distribution of this country becomes important for
realizing the high quality of contract enforcement, because the wage rate
for the enforcers aﬀects directly to the cost of enforcement. If the outside
opportunity for these enforcers is high, wages for the enforcers becomes a
burden for this economy. This means that the cost of enforcement becomes
relatively high and in some cases it is too costly for hiring the enforcers and
improving the quality of enforcement. Actually in this paper we will show
that in some cases, it is too costly for improving the quality of enforcement
and the country cannot utilize productive investment opportunities. Thus
the relative wage rate of the enforcers or income distribution in the country is
important for the size and quality of enforcement sector and the development
process.
Third, the sharing rule of the enforcement cost is another important
factor for improving the quality of enforcement. If we think about the
formal legal system, it is natural to assume that the cost for hiring judges or
policemen is shared by all people in this country. If we look at more implicit
enforcement mechanism or more private enforcement mechanism, the cost of
enforcement is paid by more directly related persons or the ones who get the
beneﬁt from the enforcement sector directly. It is not so obvious who should
pay the cost for enforcing the contracts. In this paper, we examine this point
carefully and show that in some cases sharing the cost by all people would
number of productive labor. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) described the losses
from poaching high-ability labor from a productive sector to a rent seeking sector. In
their model, even if rent seeking sector may enhance eﬃciency, an increase in the rent
seeking sector reduces technological improvement in the production sectors. Therefore,
they concluded that an increase in the rent seeking sector may be harmful to developing.
In the present paper, contrary to their model, it is indispensable for borrowing from the
credit market to invest the labor force for the enforcement sector. Acemoglu and Verdier
(2000) considered choice between market failure and bureaucrats’ corruption. They used
a type of the eﬃciency wage model in a static environment.
3be better for realizing economic development.
Furthermore, this paper shows the condition where the development pro-
cess collapses. Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) said that “one important weak-
ness of Asian economies only became apparent after they stumbled: the lack
of a good legal framework for dealing with companies in trouble.”3 It is nat-
ural to consider that the recent experience of Asian countries revealed the
importance of legal systems. However, it is still unclear why in 1990s those
countries have shown very good performances even if the legal framework
of those countries is poor. Hence we should present more convincing and
the consistent explanations about the Asian experience. This paper tries
to show such an explanation. We explain that, even if the technology of
enforcement is poor, one country can show high growth rates temporally,
but eventually it experiences economic collapses.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the en-
vironment of our model. Section 3 shows the dynamics of this economy
when the government charges the cost for enforcement to the entrepreneurs.
Section 4 investigates the situations where this economy faces an underde-
velopment trap. Section 5 considers the reallocation of enforcement cost not
only to the direct users to escape from underdevelopment traps. Section 6
shows the possibility of collapse in a development path. Section 7 presents
some extensions.
2 Model
We consider a small open economy model where overlapping generations of
two-period lived agents exist. The periods are indexed by t (t = 0,1,...).
We call entrants at period t the generation t. Each generation consists of
a unit mass of homogeneous agents. Each agent has one unit of labor only
at young and she inelastically supplies it. Thus the maximum total labor
supply in each period is equal to one, and the wage rate is wt.
The wage income will be used for the consumption at young or the
investment to consume at old. For the investment, each agent has two
options, lending her money at a competitive international credit market (we
call “lending”) or becoming an entrepreneur (we call “investing”). At the
international credit market, a time invariant and exogenously given gross
return is r > 1. If an agent lends her entire wealth to the credit market at
the end of young, therefore, her second-period consumption becomes wtr.
On the other hand, she can invest her wage to become an entrepreneur at the
end of young. One key assumption is that this investment must be one unit,
hence she must borrow 1−wt, if wt is less than one. For simplicity, we assume
that the utility function of each agent is additive separable with respect to
consumptions in both young and old periods and without discounting. Thus
3See Krugman and Obstfeld (2003), page 690.
4each agent is not willing to consume during the young period and use the
wage only for lending or investing since r is greater than one. Moreover, we
assume the initial endowment of the generation zero is exogenously given as
1 > w0 ≥ 0.
In order to simplify the production and the wage determination pro-
cesses, we assume the following simple production technology. To produce
R(> 0) units of consumption good, each entrepreneur who has one unit of
capital requires one unit of labor. For simplicity, we assume here that the
return R is divided by an exogenously given sharing rule, that is, an en-
trepreneur gets sR and a worker gets (1−s)R. Furthermore we exclude the
possibility that foreign investors become entrepreneurs of this country.
If the return of the investment sR is too low, an agent always chooses
the lending and the problem we are considering becomes trivial. Thus we
assume that sR ≥ r.
Assumption 1. sR ≥ r.
Moreover, if the wage rate is suﬃciently high, an agent needs not borrow
any amount to become an entrepreneur. Hence it is natural to assume
(1 − s)R < 1. The left hand side of this inequality is the wage income for a
worker and the right hand side is required amount for the investment.
Assumption 2. (1 − s)R < 1.
Since we assume that the gross return from the investing is larger than
gross interest rate, sR ≥ r, an agent is willing and able to become an
entrepreneur if the degree of veriﬁability is perfect. That is, if the degree
of veriﬁability is perfect, an agent can borrow necessary amount regardless
of her initial wealth, wt. In this paper, however, we assume that not all of
the gain sR is veriﬁable. In other words, this investment opportunity faces
an unveriﬁability problem, and so the lenders in the international credit
market cannot expect to get all of sR as the source of repayment for lending
to those entrepreneurs. This unveriﬁability may come from the imperfection
of enforcement activities or may come from the incompleteness of legal rules.
Actually, many developing countries have the limitation of enforcement of
contracts, and we are trying to formulate this situation.
We denote the degree of veriﬁability of these investment contracts at
period t+1 by λt+1 ∈ [0,1]. Thus the international lenders at period t expect
only λt+1sR as the maximum source of repayment. Even though contracts
promise to repay more than λt+1sR, those contracts are meaningless since
entrepreneurs choose strategic defaults and try to decrease the repayment.4
4A natural interpretation of λt+1 is as follows. The enforcement sector in the borrower’s
country can capture and repay to the lender a fraction λt+1 of the borrower’s proﬁt if
strategic default occurs. Another interpretation is that the fraction λt+1 of the borrower’s
proﬁt is perished in the process of strategic default.
5Since the lenders are able to expect this problem, they would allow the
entrepreneur to borrow only up to λt+1sR/r at period t.
The determinants of the quality of enforcement are the key to our anal-
ysis. This paper focuses on the number of enforcers for determining the
quality of enforcement. More precisely, in order to improve the enforcement
activities, the government has to hire suﬃcient number of workers to ex-
amine contracts and agents’ activities. We call those workers “enforcers.”
Those enforcers may include judges, prosecutors, and inspectors and so on.
Moreover, bureaucrats may be included to the enforcers since they aﬀect
the quality of veriﬁability by providing legal rules or government regula-
tions. Hence we assume here that λt+1 is a function of the ratio of the
number of enforcers to entrepreneurs, xt+1/nt+1, where xt+1 is the number
of contract enforcers and nt+1 is the number of entrepreneurs at period t+1,
and assume λ￿(xt+1/nt+1) > 0 and λ￿￿(xt+1/nt+1) ≤ 0.
Since the government hires the enforcers for improving the veriﬁability
of contracts, those enforcers cannot engage in the production process. It
means that this economy has to pay two types of costs in order to increase
the quality of enforcement. First, some of workers have to engage in the
enforcement activity and the enforcement activity does not contribute to the
GDP at all, thus those engagements are costly for this economy. Second, in
order to hire the workers engaging the enforcement activities, this economy
has to pay the wage costs for those workers. Hence one important issue is
who pay the wage costs.
One convincing rule is that the cost is borne by the direct user of the
enforcement sector. This means that the wage cost for hiring enforcers is
paid by the entrepreneurs through, for example, capital income tax. An-
other possible rule is that the cost is borne by all members of the economy
thorough, for example, consumption tax. In the following analysis, we clas-
sify the bearing rules of wage costs and study each of them. We assume here
that, to use the enforcement sector, the contract enforcers must be employed
in each period, that is, the cost of enforcement has to be paid in each period.
In a later section, we discuss the case in which the eﬀort of enforcers can be
accumulated to the future periods.
Since each entrepreneur requires one worker to produce R units of ﬁnal
goods, the number of enforcers limits the number of entrepreneurs, that is
nt+1 ≤ 1 − xt+1. Furthermore we have assumed that all agents are sym-
metric and every young worker faces the same incentive constraints. Thus,
nt+1 = 1 − xt+1 as long as nt+1 > 0 and it means λt+1(xt+1/nt+1) =
λ(xt+1/(1−xt+1)). For simplicity, we assume that λ(xt+1/(1−xt+1)) is the
linear function of xt+1, that is λ(xt+1/(1 − xt+1)) = axt+1, where xt+1 is
the size of enforcement sector and a > 0 is an exogenously given parameter
that represents the enforcement technology.
Each young worker decides to work in the production sector or to become
an enforcer at the beginning of each period. Because no one can compel the
6young generation to become the enforcer, the wage for enforcers has to be
the same or larger than the market wage rate. On the other hand, the
government has no incentive to pay too high wage to the enforcers, thus the
wage for the enforcers and that for production workers are the same, wt.
At the end of period t, each agent of the generation t gets the wage wt and
determines the investment choice.
We assume that the objective function of the government is to minimize
the enforcement sector xt+1 under the constraint to sustain the investment.
Since the enforcement sector does not contribute the production directly,
this must be a natural assumption. At the end of period t, the government
announces the number of enforcer at period t + 1, xt+1, which determines
the degree of veriﬁability. Given the veriﬁability level axt+1, the lenders in
the international market decide the possible lending amount. In order to
become an entrepreneur, there must be suﬃcient veriﬁability of contracts
at period t + 1 for borrowing the amount 1 − wt. Thus if the enforcement
level is too low, the possible lending amount becomes too low compared to
1−wt, and the investment cannot be realized. This means the required size
of enforcement sector at period t + 1 is a function of wt.
3 The Direct Allocation Rule
In this section, we study the case where the government charges the cost for
enforcement to entrepreneurs. Hereafter we call this “the direct allocation
rule.” This would be one natural situation since entrepreneurs directly get
the beneﬁt of the enforcement activity. Under the situation, we will show
that high degree of veriﬁability is better for increasing the veriﬁable proﬁt
for entrepreneurs, but it also increases the cost for them.
First we check the incentive of agents to become entrepreneurs. Since
she can get rwt by lending her wage to the international market, the return
of becoming entrepreneurs must be higher than (or equal to) this. For
getting suﬃcient enforcement, however, the government has to hire suﬃcient
number of enforcers and entrepreneurs must pay for them. Thus the return
for entrepreneurs might be reduced too much and be lower than rwt, if the
enforcement sector becomes too large. To consider this possibility rigorously,
let us consider the decision of an agent of the generation t. Suppose that
there are nt+1 entrepreneurs and the number of enforcers is xt+1 at period t+
1. In this situation, each entrepreneur (which are supposed to be symmetric)
has to bear the enforcement cost wt+1xt+1/nt+1. Therefore, the net return
for an entrepreneur is sR−wt+1xt+1/nt+1−r(1−wt), where r(1−wt) is the
repayment to the lender at period t+1. If this net return is larger than rwt,
an agent is willing to become an entrepreneur. Since wt+1 = (1 − s)R, the
following condition should be satisﬁed when nt+1 agents decided to becomes





As we have shown in the previous section, nt+1 = 1 − xt+1 holds as long as




The left hand side of this inequality is the return of investment including
the cost of enforcement. We shall call the above inequality the proﬁtability
condition. This condition speciﬁes the upper bound of xt+1 which satisfy
the proﬁtability of the investment. From (2), the upper bound of xt+1 is
¯ xt+1 = (sR − r)/(R − r).
Next we check the incentive of international lenders. As we explained
before, the lenders cannot seize the all return of entrepreneurs since there is
an enforcement problem. If the enforcement level is too low, lenders do not
invest suﬃcient amount for starting the production in this country. Thus




≥ r(1 − wt). (3)
The right hand side of (3) is the necessary repayment level to interna-
tional lenders, since the wage rate at period t is wt, and an agent of genera-
tion t becoming an entrepreneur has to borrow 1−wt. International lenders,
however, invest this amount only the case where they can expect to get more
than or equal to r(1−wt). The left hand side represents the possible amount
of repayment. An entrepreneur can get sR. However the enforcement sec-
tor captures only axt+1sR as the veriﬁable amount of output and then the
wage for enforcers should be paid from the captured output. Because the
amount of the enforcement cost per entrepreneur is (1−s)Rxt+1/(1−xt+1),
the left hand side of (3) represents the possible amount of repayment per an
entrepreneur. We shall call this inequality the borrowing condition.
As you can easily see, those two conditions depend on the number of
enforcers, xt+1. Therefore we can describe the feasible set of xt+1 that
satisﬁes those two conditions. Since hiring the enforcers is costly, it is natural
to assume that the government chooses the minimum xt+1 which satisﬁes
these two conditions.




≥ r(1 − w0). (4)
8Since w0 is exogenous in this model, at t = 0, the government has to
choose x1 given w0 to satisfy the above condition. In addition, such x1 has
to satisfy the proﬁtability condition. There may not exist x1 which satisﬁes
the above conditions. In this case, this economy is unable to realize the
proﬁtable investments. We will examine this possibility in the next section
more carefully.
As long as the borrowing and the proﬁtability conditions are satisﬁed





+ r(1 − (1 − s)R). (5)
From this equation, we can easily see that the optimal size of enforcement
sector x∗
t becomes time invariant at period t ≥ 2. That is, the economy
immediately goes to the steady state at t = 2 and x∗
2 = x∗
3 = ··· = x∗. Since
the total production level of this country is (1−xt)R, the size of enforcement
sector xt determines the total production level in this economy.
To sum up, we obtain the following.





≥ r(1 − min{w0,(1 − s)R}), (6)
and x ≥ (sR − r)/(R − r), the production level of this economy goes to the
steady state (1− x∗)R at t = 2, where x∗ is the minimum of x that satisﬁes
axsR − (1 − s)Rx/(1 − x) ≥ r(1 − (1 − s)R), and x ≥ (sR − r)/(R − r).
From this result, we can see that x∗ is a decreasing function of R and an
increasing function of r. The intuitive explanation of this result is simple.
If the investment opportunity of this country is very productive, the inter-
national credit market is willing to lend the money even though the degree
of enforcement is low. Hence this country needs not raise the veriﬁability
by decreasing the productive labor supply.
4 Underdevelopment Trap
The above analysis has concentrated to the cases where we can ﬁnd feasible
x satisfying both the proﬁtability condition and the borrowing condition
under the direct allocation rule. There is a possibility, however, that the
government cannot ﬁnd such x. This possibility is important to consider
the underdevelopment problems of less developed countries.
First, we consider the situations where the borrowing condition is never
satisﬁed even if the government employs many enforcers.
9Proposition 2. Under the direct allocation rule, if a < (1−s)/s, this econ-
omy cannot ﬁnd xt+1 which satisﬁes the borrowing condition.
Proof. For any positive xt+1, the left hand side of the inequality (3) is nega-
tive if a < (1−s)/s. On the other hand, the right hand side of (3) is strictly
positive. Therefore, the inequality never holds if a < (1 − s)/s.
Proposition 2 means that if the enforcement technology a is too low,
it is diﬃcult to establish high enforcement society even if the government
has decided to hire many enforcers. One interesting point is this threshold
level of a, (1−s)/s, is dependent upon the parameter of income distribution
s. By rearranging the above condition, we get s < 1/(a + 1). This means
that, when s is suﬃciently small for a given quality of the enforcement
technology a, it is diﬃcult to raise the veriﬁability and realize the investment
opportunity. The intuitive reason of this situation is as follows. The cost
and beneﬁt of the enforcement is related to the income distribution, since
the cost of enforcement depends on the wage of enforcers. Thus the cost
of enforcement is related to the income distribution of R. If the wage rate
(1 − s)R is too high, an increase in the size of enforcement sector is too
costly compared to the gain from the increase of veriﬁability.
This point has an important implication for economic development prob-
lems. It is now well known that an increase in quality of enforcements or
legal system is an important factor and many countries try to improve the
quality of enforcement. However, it is not well recognized the cost side of the
improvement of enforcement. It becomes very costly if so many workers are
needed and the wage rate of those workers is too high for the veriﬁability.
Hence the wage structure or income distribution is an important factor for
the improving veriﬁability and economic developments. This point may ex-
plain a reason why some less developed countries fail to take-oﬀ even though
they try to improve the quality of enforcement.
Next, we show that even though the inequality a < (1 − s)/s is not sat-
isﬁed, there may not be xt+1 satisfying the borrowing condition (3). When
a > (1 − s)/s, the left hand side of (3) is increasing at xt+1 = 0 and is a
concave function of xt+1. Consequently, by increasing in a, the left hand








Because the right hand side of (3) is a positive constant, whether there exist
some xt+1 that satisfy the equation (3) is dependent on the value of a, and
we get the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under the direct allocation rule, for the generations t(≥ 1),
there exist a threshold amin(> (1 − s)/s) such that, for any a < amin, the
government cannot ﬁnd xt+1 which satisﬁes the borrowing condition.
10Proof. The left hand side of borrowing condition (3) is maximized at (as − √
as − as2)/as and the maximum is strictly positive if a > (1−s)/s. More-
over, if a is multiplied by a positive number, the maximum is also multiplied
by the same magnitude. Since the right hand side of borrowing condition is
a positive constant, there exists an amin such that the borrowing condition
holds for any a ≥ amin and does not hold for any a < amin.
In the cases where there is no xt+1 satisfying the borrowing condition, the
government cannot show the credibility of enforcement and the young gen-
eration cannot borrow suﬃcient money to become the entrepreneurs. That
means this economy cannot realize the production project even though it is
proﬁtable compared to lending for the international credit market. The rea-
son of this underinvestment result, of course, comes from the unveriﬁability
or the imperfect enforcement problem. Since it is too costly to increase the
veriﬁability, this economy cannot borrow suﬃcient money from the market.
Although we have concentrated to examine the borrowing condition,
we should care even about the proﬁtability condition for determining the
optimal x rigorously. Even if this economy satisﬁes the borrowing condition,
it may not satisfy the proﬁtability condition. As we have derived in Section
3, the proﬁtability condition requires the upper bound of xt+1, ¯ xt+1 = (sR−
r)/(R − r). Thus even if the economy can derive the minimum x satisfying
the borrowing condition, it goes to the underdevelopment trap when this
minimum x is larger than ¯ xt+1.
These could be reasons of underdevelopment in less developed countries.
Since the enforcement is too costly, this economy cannot realize the high
veriﬁability and cannot make use of the investment opportunity. One im-
portant point of this result is that the income distribution is crucial for the
feasibility of enforcement and economic development. In the next section,
we consider another sharing rule of enforcement cost and the re-distribution
policy.
5 Reallocation of Enforcement Cost
In the previous sections, we have assumed that the government allocates the
cost for enforcement only to the entrepreneurs. The contract enforcement
is, however, usually treated as a public service and it might be natural
to assume that the government allocates the cost not only to the direct
users. For considering this point, we assume in this section that young
workers pay all of the enforcement costs. We call this “the reallocation
rule.” Of course, this situation is an extreme one, but we can ﬁnd general
property of reallocation policies by this examination. The main purpose of
this examination is to study whether or not the country can escape from
underdevelopment traps by the reallocation of the enforcement costs.
11Let us now start to derive the proﬁtability condition and the borrow-
ing condition under the present cost reallocation rule. In this case, the
proﬁtability condition is obvious. Since entrepreneurs do not have to pay
the enforcement cost, the return of investment does not include it. Hence
the proﬁtability condition becomes sR ≥ r and it is always satisﬁed under
Assumption 1.
On the other hand, the borrowing condition for the generation t under
the present cost allocation rule is
axt+1sR ≥ r(1 − wt). (7)
The left hand side is the expected proﬁt which the international lenders can
seize, and the right hand side is the necessary amount of repayment from
an entrepreneur to the investors. We should be careful that wt is diﬀerent
from (1−s)R in this case because workers have to pay the enforcement cost.
Since there are xt enforcers at period t, (1−xt) young workers have to share
the enforcement cost xtwt. Hence wt has to satisfy the following condition,
wt = (1 − s)R − xtwt/(1 − xt),
and we get the following equilibrium (after the tax or net) wage rate,
wt = (1 − xt)(1 − s)R. (8)
Thus by arranging the borrowing condition (7) with (8), we get
axt+1sR ≥ r(1 − (1 − s)R) + r(1 − s)Rxt. (9)
One important point of the condition (9) is that the right hand side is
independent of xt+1. Since the entrepreneurs of generation t do not have to
pay the enforcement cost at t+1, the amount of borrowing does not depend
on the current enforcement level, xt+1. On the other hand, the left hand
side is an increasing function of xt+1 since an increase of the enforcement
level is better for the international lenders. Thus by increasing of xt+1, it
becomes easier to satisfy the condition (9), the borrowing condition for given
wt. This situation is very diﬀerent from that in the previous section.
In the case of previous section, the entrepreneurs have to pay the current
enforcement cost, so that increasing in the size of the enforcement sector
reduces the net proﬁt of the investment for each entrepreneur. Hence it is
not always better for the entrepreneurs to increase the enforcement level
xt+1. However, in the case of this section, the entrepreneurs do not have
to pay the enforcement costs, so that the net proﬁt of the investment for
each entrepreneur does not change even if the enforcement level xt+1 has
increased. An increase in the enforcement level simply raises the expected
return of international investors. Hence it becomes easier to ﬁnd out xt+1
which satisﬁes the borrowing condition for given wt.
12As we have shown, both the proﬁtability condition and the borrowing
condition are easier to satisfy for given wt under the allocation rule consid-
ered in this section. Therefore, we obtain the following.
Proposition 4. Given wt, the generation t becomes easier to start the in-
vestment project at the period t + 1 if the enforcement cost is reallocated to
the young workers.
Thus by shifting the enforcement cost, this economy may implement the
proﬁtable investment which is not realized when the entrepreneurs have to
pay the cost.
We should be careful, however, that the reallocation of the enforcement
cost to the young workers is not “a free lunch” for this economy. Since young
workers have to pay the enforcement cost, their initial fund for becoming
entrepreneurs is decreased by the reallocation. Consequently, they have to
borrow more to become entrepreneurs and the government has to raise x to
satisfy the borrowing condition for them. Hence the next question we should
consider is whether xt+1 satisfying the borrowing condition can converge to
the steady state with positive production or not.
From the inequality (9), we can ﬁnd the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Under the reallocation rule, there exist a steady state with
positive production if and only if s > r/(aR). The steady state x∗∗ is
x∗∗ =
r(1 − (1 − s)R)









13Figure 1 explains this situation. Since the government chooses the min-
imum xt+1 under the constraint of inequality (9), the following equation
should be satisﬁed.
xt+1 =






In order to have the steady state (xt = xt+1), the right hand side of the
equation (10) is less than one at xt = 1. This is equivalent to the condition,
s > r/(aR).
From this condition, we can understand that the income distribution
parameter s is important even in this case. Suﬃciently high s is necessary
for continuing the investment. An intuitive explanation is as follows. If s is
suﬃciently high, the wage rate for the enforcers becomes low and the cost
for enforcement does not become so large. This means that the negative
impact for raising xt+1, the decrease of the young workers’ gain, becomes
not so high and the borrowing condition can be satisﬁed by raising of xt+1.
In this allocation rule, for any w0, the investment is implemented at
every period and the total production level converges to (1 − x∗∗)R as long
as s > r/(aR). This situation is very diﬀerent from the situation under the
direct allocation rule. In the situation described in Section 3, the initial
condition w0 is important. If w0 is too small, the initial investment is not
realized and this economy cannot realize the investment at every period. In
the situation where young workers pay the enforcement cost (i.e., under the
reallocation rule), the initial level of wealth, w0, is irrelevant and investments
are realized at every period as long as s > r/(aR).
By combining the conditions of Propositions 2 and 5, we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. If r/(aR) < s ≤ 1/(a + 1), the direct allocation rule does
not realize the investment in the steady state. However, it becomes possible
to sustain the investments in every period by sifting the enforcement cost
from the entrepreneurs to the young workers.
Next we compare x∗and x∗∗. If the steady state with positive production
exists under both of the two diﬀerent allocation rules, is x∗∗ smaller than
x∗? Although the general comparison between x∗ and x∗∗ is complicated,
we can get the following result.
Proposition 7. Even though x∗ and x∗∗ exists, if x∗ > (r − 1)/r, x∗∗ is
smaller than x∗.
Proof. Let deﬁne LD(x) = (1−s)Rx/(1−x)+r(1−(1−s)R), and LR(x) =
r(1 − s)Rx + r(1 − (1 − s)R). Since LD(x) = LR(x) at x = (r − 1)/r and
LD￿￿
> 0, LD(x∗) > LR(x∗) if x∗ > (r−1)/r. This means, if x∗ > (r−1)/r,
asRx∗ = LD(x∗) > LR(x∗) and thus x∗∗ < x∗.
14This means that, when x∗ is suﬃciently large, it is better to allocate the
enforcement cost to the young workers even if there exists the steady state
with positive production under the direct allocation rule.
6 Collapse of Development
In the previous section, we have examined the situations in which the cost of
enforcement is borne by the young workers and the borrowing condition can
be satisﬁed by increasing in the size of enforcement sector. In some cases,
however, the borrowing condition may not be satisﬁed in the long run. As
we have examined in the previous section, this economy reaches the steady
state with positive production as long as s ≥ r/(aR) under the reallocation









As Figure 2 shows, if s < r/(aR), the economy does not converge to a
steady state with positive production. One interesting aspect in this case
is that it shows the possibility of “development collapse.” This economy
can realize the investments for a while, however, eventually it cannot satisfy
the borrowing condition and the investment should be stopped. This means
that the economy experiences a sudden decline of GDP, in other words, this
country experiences “sudden collapse.”
Under the direct allocation rule, it is impossible to realize the investments
if s < 1/(a + 1). By changing the allocation rule to the reallocation rule,
the government can realize the investment. In this sense, the change of the
allocation rule is a good strategy for the government, since this economy can
15escape from the underinvestment trap. If s ≤ r/(aR), however, the economy
gradually requires larger size of enforcement sector to sustain the borrowing
condition as Figure 2 shows, and ﬁnally it experiences the collapse. Hence
the changing of the allocation rule about the enforcement cost is not a perfect
solution to escape from the underdevelopment trap. In order to sustain the
investment, this country has to raise the income distribution parameter, s,
to r/(aR) or has to raise a.
This phenomenon could explain the recent experience of Asian countries.
As we have explained in the introduction, Asian countries experienced high
economic growth and sudden economic crisis. The lack of a good legal
framework for dealing with companies is one reason of the trouble, and it
is sometimes claimed that the recent experience of Asian countries revealed
the importance of legal systems. However, it has been still unclear why
in 1990s those countries have shown very good performances if the legal
framework of those countries is poor. The dynamics of the above situation
may become one answer to the puzzle. Here we have shown that even
if the technology of enforcement a is poor, s ≤ r/(aR), one country can
implement the investment by using the reallocation rule. Such development
path, however, cannot be sustained as shown in Figure 2. The cost of
enforcement gradually expands and ﬁnally it becomes impossible to sustain
the growth path. This could be consistent with the economic crisis in Asian
countries. This result shows that the legal framework for enforcement is
important for economic growth in the long run. Even if an economy can
sustain an economic growth path for a while, that may not guarantee the
long run stable economic growth. Developing countries may have to establish
a good legal framework.
For that purpose, however, a country has to pay the cost for setting up
the better legal framework. This paper has shown that the income distri-
bution is an important parameter to realize the good legal framework and
economic growth.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper studied an economy with an imperfect enforcement problem.
By endogenizing the cost of improving the quality of contract enforcement,
we have derived several implications. The main result is that the income
redistribution policies and the enforcement policies are not independent for
the government. Even if the policies for improving the quality of contract
enforcement are the same, the dynamic path or the development process
of one country may become diﬀerent from another country if their income
distribution or income redistribution policies are diﬀerent. Thus when we
look at the policies for enforcement, we should be careful with the optimal
combination of income distribution policies and the enforcement policies.
16To conclude the paper, we describe three remarks in order. First, in
this paper we have assumed for simplicity that the allocation of proﬁt is
determined by a given parameter s and we did not consider the possibility
that the proﬁt allocation rule is aﬀected by the market conditions. For
example, if there are so many workers compared to the entrepreneurs, it
might be natural to assume that s should be increased. Even if we extend
our model to such general situations, however, our qualitative results do
not change. Even in those extended situations, the income distribution
parameter is important for the determination of the size and quality of
enforcement sector and the entrepreneurs’ investment decision. If s depends
on the size of enforcement sector x (or the number of young workers 1−x),
however, the dynamic path may show some cycles. This is a new aspect of
results, when we extend our simple framework to more general situations.
Second, the possibility of corruption in enforcement process is ignored
in this paper. However, this is an important issue in the situation where the
enforcement sector has the competence of enforcement. If the government
employs the eﬃciency wage for the enforcers (or bureaucrats) for solving
the corruption problem as studied in Acemoglu and Verdier (2001), the cost
of enforcement increases and therefore the implementation of borrowing is
more diﬃcult than that in the no-corruption situation.
Last, we have assumed that the devoted eﬀort by the enforcers is not
accumulated in this model. However, if we treat these eﬀorts as the eﬀort for
making optimal legal rules, these rules would be eﬀective even in the future
and we should treat they are accumulated. It is not so diﬃcult to extend
our model to such general situations. For example we may be possible to
assume the technology of contract enforcement a is aﬀected by the previous
size of enforcement sector x. In such situation it might be better to devote
more labor forces at the beginning of this economy and raise the future a
to sustain a growth path. Rigorous examinations about these possibilities
would be interesting future researches.
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